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It is one of those ironies of history that the twelfth-century Andalu-
sian philosopher Averroes (Abu l-Walid b. Rushd), largely ignored in
the Muslim world in the centuries that followed his death in 1198,
should stand today at the center of much of the contemporary intellec-
tual debate about secularism in the Arab world. A leading voice in this
debate is that of the Egyptian Enlightenment Society, founded in 1987
by a group of scholars and intellectuals for the purpose of counteracting
This essay argues that, underlying the legal
framework of Averroes’s Fasl al-maqal, there
appears to be a genuine desire to reconcile the
claims of reason with the demands of faith;
then, that Averroes based this reconciliation on
the acceptance of a hermeneutical theory that
sees the divine Word as addressing all human
beings according to their intellectual capaci-
ties and that, consequently, he did not exclude
the learned from the religious duty of assent-
ing to revealed truth. Finally, and contrary to
overstated secularist interpretations of his ra-
tionalism, it is suggested that there are
grounds to defend the view that Averroes con-
ceived of philosophy in quasi-religious terms,
as the noblest work to be carried out in the
presence of God, making its practitioners the
rightful ‘heirs of the prophets’.
Key words: Averroes; Islamic Rationalism;
Falsafa; Fasl al-maqal.
El presente artículo argumenta que por debajo
del marco jurídico del Fasl al-maqal subyace
el deseo de conciliar los requerimientos de la
razón con las exigencias de la fe. Averroes
basa tal conciliación en la aceptación de una
teoría hermenéutica según la cual, la Palabra
Divina se dirige a cada ser humano según su
capacidad intelectual. Por consiguiente, Ave-
rroes no excluye a los sabios del deber reli-
gioso de asentir a la verdad revelada.
Contrariamente a interpretaciones exagerada-
mente secularizadoras de su racionalismo, el
artículo sugiere que Averroes concibió la filo-
sofía en términos cuasi religiosos, como la
obra más noble que se puede llevar a cabo en
presencia de Dios, cuyo ejercicio convierte a
sus practicantes en los legítimos «herederos
de los profetas».
Palabras clave: Averroes; racionalismo islá-
mico; Falsafa; Fasl al-maqal.
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the increasing Islamist influence. With this aim in view, the Society
initiated in 1993 a series of reprints of books representative of the libe -
ral-secularist tradition that developed in Egypt from the mid-nineteenth
to the mid-twentieth century, in the wake of Napoleon’s Egyptian cam-
paign. Significantly, the first book chosen for reprinting was Farah
Antun’s (d. 1922) Ibn Rushd wa-falsafatu-hu (The Philosophy of Aver-
roes), originally published in Alexandria in 1903.1 Antun was a
Lebanese Christian secularist who spent most of his adult life in Egypt.
He embraced to a large extent Ernest Renan’s (d. 1892) view that the
death of Averroes constituted a central turning-point in Islamic intel-
lectual history: the end of Arabic Aristotelian philosophy and the tri-
umph of the Qur,an over free thought during the following six
centuries.2 Antun’s presentation of Averroes, however, did not go un-
challenged. The influential Egyptian Muslim reformist, Muhammad
Abduh (d. 1905), sought to rehabilitate Averroes as a brilliant example
of a Muslim philosopher in a series of articles, reacting against what
he saw as Antun’s materialistic interpretation of Averroes.3 The Antun-
Abduh controversy did not abate with the death of its protagonists. Fol-
lowing the lead of the first, Averroes became the rallying point for
several contemporary Arab proponents of secularism and the emanci-
pation of reason from religion. A different group of Arab intellectuals,
following the lead of Abduh, have insisted on depicting Averroes as
the exemplar of a tradition within Islam which postulates the absolute
harmony of revelation and reason, rejecting on this basis the strong
secularist views espoused by the first group.4
1 See Daiber, Bibliography of Islamic Philosophy, pp. 66-67.
2 In effect, Renan’s views, which he exposed in his famous Averroès et l’averroïsme:
essai historique (Paris, 1852), became the reference point for most subsequent scholarship
on the famous Cordovan philosopher –Western and Muslim alike. For a presentation of
the constitution, reception, and edition of Averroes’s corpus, see Endress, “Le projet d’A-
verroès: Constitution, réception et édition du corpus des oeuvres d’Ibn Rushd.” On Antun’s
interest in Renan, see Puig Montada, “Farah Antun: Active Reception of European
Thought,” especially pp. 1014-1018.
3 For a brief presentation of this debate, see al-Khoudheiri, “Ibn Rushd et la pensée
arabe moderne.” See also the bibliography cited in Puig Montada, “FarahAntun,” p. 1017,
n. 34.
4 Among the proponents of the secularist interpretation of Averroes, we can mention
Muhammad ‛Atif al-‛Iraqi (d. 2012), Murad Wahba, Muhammad ‛Abid al-Jabiri (d. 2010),
and Tayyib Tizini. Among those who favored a reading of Averroes as harmonizing reason
and revelation, we can mention Mahmud Qasim (d. 1973), Muhammad ‛Ammara, and
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An external observer might be tempted to think that the strongly
divergent views on Averroes put forward by the participants in this de-
bate are, in fact, projections of their different views on what should be
the role of religion in contemporary Arab society and of their socio-
political preferences. In other words, one might be tempted to believe
that the real Averroes can be easily discovered by means of a detached
and politically neutral reading of his writings. Such an assumption,
however, is quickly shattered by even a cursory survey of recent aca-
demic scholarship in Western languages, which reveals a wealth of di-
verse interpretations of the Cordovan philosopher. It is commonly
accepted that that relationship between reason and faith was one of the
recurring issues of Jewish, Christian, and Islamic medieval philosophy.
Likewise, almost everybody concurs that Averroes deserves pride of
place in the history of this debate, and there is a general consensus that
his work, Fasl al-maqal (often known as the Decisive Treatise), is ab-
solutely crucial in this respect. However, there is considerable disagree-
ment on what exactly his position was.5 My aim in what follows is not
to review all the literature written on the subject –an impossible task
anyway–, but instead to engage three particular lines of interpretation
of Averroes that I would like to challenge, at least partially. It should
be noted, however, that not all the authors mentioned in this essay are
necessarily scholars specializing in Averroes, nor are my comments in-
tended to be a judgment on their entire scholarship. The works in ques-
tion have been chosen because they illustrate with particular clarity
Hasan Hanafi. Accounts of this debate can be found in Kügelgen, “A Call for Rationalism:
‘Arab Averroists’ in the Twentieth Century”; Wild, “Islamic Enlightenment and the Paradox
of Averroes”; and Najjar, “Ibn Rushd (Averroes) and the Egyptian Enlightenment Move-
ment.” See also Lahoud, Political Thought in Islam: A Study in Intellectual Boundaries,
pp. 110-125 on Ibn Rushd’s liberalism.
5 The complete title of this work is Kitab fasl al-maqal wa-taqrir ma bayna al-shari‛a
wa-l-hikma min al-ittisal. Hereafter, references to this work will be taken from Butter-
worth’s translation (with parallel Arabic text), The Book of the Decisive Treatise Deter-
mining the Connection between the Law and Wisdom (2008). Other translations of the Fasl
al-maqal mentioned in this article are: Müller, Harmonie der Religion und Philosophie
(1875); Gauthier, Accord de la religion et de la philosophie (1905); Hourani, On the Har-
mony of Religion and Philosophy (1961); Lucchetta, L’accordo della legge divina con la
filosofia (1994); Campanini, Il trattato decisivo sull’accordo della religione con la filosofia
(1994) and Geoffroy, Le livre du discours décisive (1996). For a readable account of Aver-
roes’s life and times, see Urvoy, Ibn Rushd (Averroès). A detailed analysis of Averroes’s
written production can be found in Cruz Hernández, Abu-l-Walid Ibn Rusd (Averroes):
Vida, obra, pensamiento, influencia.
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6 Reference to the canonical hadith which quotes the Prophet as saying: “The excel-
lence of the learned over the devotee is like that of the full moon over the other stars. The
learned (‛ulama,) are the heirs of the prophets. The prophets bequeath neither dinar nor
dirham but rather knowledge; so he who receives it, obtains an abundant portion” (See
Arabic text in Abu Da,ud, English translation of Sunan Abu Dawud, vol. 4, p. 207).
7 Heller-Roazen, “Philosophy before the Law: Averroës’s Decisive Treatise,” p. 412.
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certain views on Averroes that I would like to consider here. After pre-
senting and discussing these views, it will be argued that, underlying
the legal framework of Fasl al-maqal, there appears to be a genuine
desire to reconcile the claims of reason with the demands of faith;
 second, that Averroes based this reconciliation on the acceptance of a
hermeneutical theory that sees the divine Word as addressing all human
beings according to their intellectual capacities and that, consequently,
he did not exclude the learned from the religious duty of assenting to
revealed truth. Finally, and contrary to overstated secularist interpreta-
tions of his rationalism, I will propound that there are grounds to defend
the view that Averroes conceived of philosophy in quasi-religious
terms, as the noblest work to be carried out in the presence of God,
making its practitioners the rightful ‘heirs of the prophets.’6
Philosophy before the Law
A necessary starting-point for any consideration of Averroes’s in-
tention in Fasl al-maqal is the assertion made by certain scholars that
in this treatise Averroes was dealing with an intrinsically Islamic prob-
lem which is foreign to medieval Western discussions on the relation-
ship between faith and reason. This is the view, for instance, of Daniel
Heller-Roazen, for whom the Fasl al-maqal epitomizes the challenge
raised by Islam to classical philosophy: to justify itself before the Law.
For this author, the rescue of the Greek heritage from oblivion, thanks
to its translation into Arabic during the ‘Abbasid era, came at a price:
“philosophy was called upon to give reasons for itself in the face  
of the authority of the Qur,an and the teaching of its prophet,” an
 unprecedented demand “which at once threatened it with extinction
and promised it the possibility of a new life.”7 Heller-Roazen insists
on the singularity of this challenge and the differing conditions in
which philosophy found itself in Islamic lands and in Christian Europe.
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In the latter, doctrine became the domain in which the differences
 between Greek thinking and the principles of Christianity were to be
reconciled. This could not be the case with Islam,
for the religion announced by Muhammad, in contrast to Christianity, had its center
neither in faith nor dogma but an element at once theological and political: the
Law (shari‛a), the single revealed body of prescriptions and prohibitions under-
stood by the Islamic tradition to be simultaneously civil and religious, temporal
and spiritual.8
Within this Law-based order, the vindication of philosophy could
only be juridical. Philosophy had to justify itself before jurisprudence,
and this is exactly what Averroes attempted in the Fasl al-maqal, an
examination of philosophy in terms of the religious Law of Islam. This
would explain, moreover, why this treatise, unlike other writings of
Averroes, was never translated into Latin and did not attract the atten-
tion of the Christian West before the nineteenth century. That it found
more receptivity among Jewish thinkers instead bears witness to the
affinity that exists between Judaism and Islam as “religions of 
the Law.”9 The Jewish heirs of Greek philosophy, like their Islamic
counterparts, felt the need to justify the study of a pagan science before
the rule of the religious law.
A gulf, however, separates both religious traditions from that of the Christian West.
There, the schoolmen were engaged in the attempt to justify the study of philoso-
phy by demonstrating its relation, not to law, but to faith.10
This stark contrast between Christianity, on the one hand, and Ju-
daism and Islam, on the other, leads Heller-Roazen to conclude that
the Fasl al-maqal:
is not a work on the conflict, concordance, or unity of faith and reason; nor is it an
elucidation of the relation between the doctrines imposed by one and those dictated
by the other. It is, instead, a juridical tract of a specific type, a fatwa, a legal re-
sponsum that seeks to determine the precise status of philosophy before the Law
8 Heller-Roazen, “Philosophy before the Law,” p. 413.
9 Heller-Roazen, “Philosophy before the Law,” p. 418. On the Jewish reception of the
Fasl al-maqal, see Golb, “The Hebrew Translation of Averroës’ Fasl al-maqal,” and Har-
vey, Falaquera’s ‘Epistle of the Debate’: An Introduction to Jewish Philosophy. For a con-
cise account of the impact of Averroes on the Jewish world more generally, see Leaman,
“Averroism, Jewish.”
10 Heller-Roazen, “Philosophy before the Law,” p. 418.
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11 Heller-Roazen, “Philosophy before the Law,” pp. 419- 420.
12 See, for instance, Bonin, “A Muslim Perspective on Philosophy & Religion: The
‘Decisive Treatise’ of Averroes.” In the concluding part of this talk presented at the Fran-
ciscan University of Steubenville on November 4, 2006, Bonin addresses the question of
why the Fasl al-maqal failed to attract the attention of Christian Europe. She finds this
lack of attention surprising, given the abundance of “heterodox philosophers” in thirteenth-
century Paris who, to her mind, would have found in it a “source and support for their
musings” (p. 22). She goes on to say that, in fact, this lack of attention is not so surprising
if we notice that the problem facing philosophers in the Islamic world differed from that
facing their counterparts in the Christian world. Like Heller-Roazen, Bonin sees the Fasl
al-maqal as an attempt to determine the relation not between faith and reason but between
religion and philosophy –where “religion” translates shari‛a, that is, religious law. She
writes: “Faith is the keynote in Christianity, but not in Islam, where law and submission
to law are primary” (p. 23).
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… Carried out according to the protocols of the juridical examination, the judgment
announced at the opening of the Decisive Treatise promises to settle, in this way,
the vexed question of the legal status of philosophy. For such a judgment alone,
resting on an identification of the specific juridical qualifications of philosophy,
can ‘decisively’ determine the ‘relation between wisdom and the Law.’11
What can we say about such an analysis of the Fasl al-maqal, which
is by no means exclusive of this author?12 Averroes was indeed an ac-
complished legal scholar who served as judge at Seville and Cordoba,
and it is undeniable that his defense of philosophy in the Fasl al-maqal
takes the form of a legal opinion, a fact that would have been puzzling
to Western readers unfamiliar with Islamic jurisprudence. The opening
terms of the Fasl al-maqal are clear in this sense:
Now, the goal of this statement is for us to investigate, from the perspective of
Law-based reflection, whether reflection upon philosophy and the sciences of logic
is permitted, prohibited, or commanded –and this as a recommendation or as an
obligation– by the Law (§ 1).
It is likewise indisputable that Islam (and Judaism, for that matter)
has its own historical characteristics and that one should not rush to es-
tablish easy parallels with Christianity. However, it would be unwar-
ranted to conclude that the Fasl al-maqal has nothing to do with the
conflict between faith and reason as it developed in the Christian West.
Heller-Roazen fails to notice that the word shari‛a and its cognate shar‛
are not always (not even primarily) used in the Fasl al-maqal in the
legal sense of Islamic jurisprudence. Both terms have a more basic
meaning that points to the prescribed character of religion as such, that
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is, to the fact that Islam does not understand itself as an expression of
the human quest for God, but as a religious system entirely based on
the prophetic transmission of the divine Word.13 In this sense, shari‛a
includes all the teachings on every level that can be said to be Islamic,
and not merely the juridical status of particular actions.14 Thus, even if
the Fasl al-maqal has the external form of a legal opinion, Averroes is
very much aware that the entire edifice of Islamic law rests upon the
acceptance by faith of the Qur,an and the Sunna as the revealed Word
of God. In Averroes’s own words:
Since all of this has been determined and we, the Muslim community, believe that
this divine Law of ours (shari‛atana hadihi l-ilahiyya) is true and is the one alerting
to and calling for this happiness –which is cognizance of God (Mighty and Mag-
nificent) and of His creation… (§ 11).
Moreover, the fatwa properly speaking, establishing the legal status
of the study of philosophy and the sciences of logic, occupies approxi-
mately one fifth of the entire treatise (§ 1-11). The rest of the treatise
(§ 12-60) is mainly devoted to addressing the theological objection that
had led AbuHamid al-Ghazali (d. 1111) to condemn certain philosoph-
ical doctrines, namely, their apparent contradiction of the revealed text.
In fact, it would not be an overstatement to say that the fundamental
question addressed by Averroes in Fasl al-maqal is precisely the “rec-
onciling of what is intellected with what is transmitted” (al-jam‛ bayna
al-ma‛qul wa-l-manqul) (§ 14). Averroes will defend that such a recon-
ciliation is indeed possible by positing the need of interpreting figura-
tively “the apparent sense of a pronouncement about something in the
Law [that] differs from what demonstration leads to” (§ 14). In address-
ing this question, Averroes uses shar‛ia and shar‛ to refer first and fore-
most to the Qur,an itself, the revealed Word of God accepted by faith:
13 See, for instance, Qur,an 42:13: “He has ordained for you of religion (shara,a lakum
min al-din) that He enjoined upon Noah and that which We have revealed to you, [O
Muhammad], and what We enjoined upon Abraham and Moses and Jesus – to establish
the religion and not be divided therein” (Saheeh International Translation).
14 For the range of meanings in relation to religion and religious law associated with
the word shari‛a, see Calder, “Shari‛a,” in EI2. The difficulty of translating the term shari,a
in the Fasl al-maqal can be seen in the many different ways in which translators have ren-
dered the title of this treatise into Western languages: “religion” (Müller, 1875; Gauthier,
1905; Hourani, 1961; Campanini, 1994), “revelation” (Geoffroy, 1996), “divine Law”
(Lucchetta, 1994); and “Law” (Butterworth, 2008), to give but a few examples.
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15 Heller-Roazen, “Philosophy before the Law,” p. 424, emphasis added.
16 I share for the most part Joseph Buijs’s view that the conflict between faith and rea-
son, tradition and speculation, mysticism and rationalism –and even religion and science,
to mention its more recent version– are alternative formulations of a central problem
throughout medieval thought, that of the relationship between religion and philosophy. “In
this sense,” writes Buijs, “faith involves a way of holding and justifying beliefs on the
basis of divine revelation, which manifests itself through such diverse channels as sacred
scriptures, prophecy, or tradition. It is the purported truth-claims of these beliefs that
 generate the problem of faith and reason and of the relationship between religion and phi-
losophy, or between religion and science” (Buijs, “Religion and Philosophy in Maimonides,
Averroes, and Aquinas,” pp. 161-162).
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It has been transmitted that many in the early days [of Islam] used to be of the
opinion that the Law (al-shar‛) has both an apparent and an inner sense and that it
is not obligatory for someone to know about the inner sense if he is not an adept
in knowledge of it nor capable of understanding it (§ 15).
To recapitulate, Averroes’s central concern in Fasl al-maqal is that of
responding to al-Ghazali’s accusation that the philosophers should be
charged with unbelief on account of their denial of what he considers
three explicitly revealed doctrines: the eternity of the world, God’s knowl-
edge of particulars, and the resurrection of bodies in the hereafter. These
were doctrinal questions on the same theoretical level of those debated
by philosophers and theologians in the Christian West. These were not,
as Heller-Roazen puts it, “cases of a seeming conflict between demon-
stration and legal doctrine.”15 Put differently, Averroes is concerned with
the relation between what religion asks the believing philosopher to
 accept by faith (that is, that the Qur,an is the revealed Word of God dis-
pensing divine truth to humanity), and the conclusions the exercise of his
rationality may lead him to. In other words, Averroes is concerned with
the relation between faith and reason, and it is crucial that the legal frame
of Averroes’s treatise should not cause us to miss this point.16
Reading between the Lines
Differing interpretations of the Fasl al-maqal are reflected in the way
in which scholars interpret the treatise’s title: Fasl al-maqal wa-taqrir
ma bayna al-shari‛a wa-l-hikma min al-ittisal. I have already mentioned
the difficulty of translating shari‛a. Other key words in the title are fasl
and ittisal. With respect to the first term, the 1905 French translation by
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Léon Gauthier, who rendered the title as “Traité décisif sur l’accord de
la religion et de la philosophie,” seems to have influenced most transla-
tions thereafter, all of which use the adjective ‘decisive’ (Hourani, 1961;
Campanini, 1994; Butterworth, 2008). This interpretation is based on
the second meaning of the verb fasala yafsilu, to render a decisive judg-
ment thereby putting an end to a dispute. As for ittisal, while Gauthier,
followed by Campanini, translates it as ‘accord,’ Hourani and Butter-
worth prefer the more neutral and more literal ‘connection.’17
A radically different interpretation of the title, and consequently of
Averroes’s aim in this treatise, is offered by Abdelmajid El-Ghannouchi.
He ascribes to Gauthier (and indirectly to Marcus Müller, author of the
1875 German translation of the Fasl al-maqal) the theory that Averroes
was proposing the accord between religion and philosophy, a theory
that set the tone for many of the ensuing interpretations of this work.
“Or nous découvrons chez Averroès,” protests El-Ghannouchi, 
non pas une théorie de l’accord entre la religion et la philosophie, comme l’a sou-
tenu Léon Gauthier, mais une distinction claire et nette entre deux ordres de vérité,
le premier étant fondé sur la croyance, le second établi sur la démonstration.18
For this author, Gauthier’s translation of the treatise’s title was ten-
dentious insofar as he translated Fasl al-maqal as ‘decisive treatise,’
instead of ‘distinction of discourse,’ and ittisal as ‘accord,’ instead of
‘relation,’ ‘connection,’ or ‘link.’ In so doing, he obscured Averroes’s
real intention, namely, that of distinguishing between the religious dis-
course and the philosophical discourse, while affirming a relation
 between the two (i.e., their common aim of promoting virtuous life).
According to El-Ghannouchi, Gauthier based his thesis on the 
un critical reading of two assertions of Averroes in the Fasl al-maqal.
The first is his teleological definition of philosophy as the “reflection
upon existing things and consideration of them insofar as they are an
17 “Traité décisif sur l’accord de la religion et de la philosophie” (Gauthier, 1905);
“The decisive treatise, determining the nature of the connection between religion and phi-
losophy” (Hourani, 1961); “Il trattato decisivo sull’accordo della religione con la filosofia”
(Campanini, 1994); “The book of the decisive treatise, determining the connection between
the Law and wisdom” (Butterworth, 2008).
18 El-Ghannouchi, “Ibn Rushd et la double vérité: La séparation du discours religieux
du discours philosophique et l’établissement du rapport entre les deux,” p. 107. For El-
Ghannouchi’s views on the question, see also his “Distinction et relation des discours phi-
losophiques et religieux chez Ibn Rushd: Fasl al-maqal ou la double vérité.”
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19 El-Ghannouchi, “Ibn Rushd et la double vérité,” p. 108.
20 El-Ghannouchi, “Ibn Rushd et la double vérité,” p. 109.
Al-Qantara XXXVI 1, 2015, pp. 45-68  ISSN 0211-3589  doi: 10.3989/alqantara.2015.002
DIEGO R. SARRIÓ54
indication of the Artisan” (§ 2), a significant departure from Aristotle’s
 definition of philosophy in Metaphysics as the study of being qua being.
For El-Ghannouchi, this “specious” definition of philosophy was only
a concession made by Averroes for the sake of legitimizing the study
of philosophy from the religious viewpoint so as to be able to pursue
the philosophical study undisturbed: 
Par une définition spécieuse, Fasl al-maqal réduit la philosophie à la théologie
religieuse, c’est-à-dire à l’anti-philosophie, pour légitimer ici même l’étude
philosophique par la religion et obtenir le titre et le droit de s’y adonner.19
As for the second assertion from Fasl al-maqal that, according  
to El-Ghannouchi, Gauthier accepted uncritically, that is, without 
applying a hermeneutic of suspicion that reads between the lines, it is
Averroes’s famous declaration that,
Since the Law (shari‛a) is true and calls to the reflection leading to cognizance of
the truth, we, the Muslim community, know firmly that demonstrative reflection
does not lead to differing with what is set down in the Law. For truth does not
 oppose truth; rather, it agrees with and bears witness to it (§ 12).
To derive from this that Averroes defends the accord or harmony
between religion and philosophy is, for this author, an erroneous con-
clusion, which is not only incongruent with Averroes’s entire philo-
sophical writings, but which also fails to notice the conditional
character of the Arabic sentence: “Since this Law is true…” (wa-idha
kanat hadihi l-shari‛a haqqan…). For El-Ghannouchi, this should be
taken to mean that the truth of religion would not oppose the truth of
philosophy only if religion could be proved to be philosophically true,
something which is not possible. According to this reading, Averroes
holds the existence of two orders of truth: on the one hand, philoso -
phical truth, established by demonstrative reason, and, on the other hand,
religious truth, based on prophetic revelation. These two orders of truth
are heterogeneous, not exchangeable, and irreducible to one another:
Il est indéniable que le vrai ne s’oppose pas au vrai, mais à la condition sine qua
non qu’ils appartiennent tous deux au même système de référence dans lequel ils
seraient interchangeables. En dehors de ce même système, on aurait une vérité
selon la foi et une autre selon la science et la philosophie.20
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 Middle Ages,” pp. 80-83. See also Harvey, “The Quiddity of Philosophy according to
Averroes and Falaquera, a Muslim Philosopher and his Jewish Interpreter.”
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Religious truth is based on revelation and accepted by faith. The
salvation of the common people resides in the literal acceptance of this
truth, which therefore must be constantly purified from the accretions
and misleading interpretations of theologians. Philosophical truth, how-
ever, is reserved for the elite, and it is to be found in the demonstrative
books that examine philosophical questions such as God’s existence,
the eternity of the world, the divine decree and predestination, the
 immortality of the intellect, etc. This truth must be kept away from  
the common person, who, unable to understand it, would either ridicule
it or be led into confusion.
For El-Ghannouchi, the Western separation between religion and
philosophy and between the spiritual and the secular rests upon this
distinction between the religious and philosophical discourses which
was first formulated in Arabic by Averroes and later confirmed by the
philosophers in thirteenth-century Paris, a path that the Islamic world
was unable to take:
Le monde occidental se détacha définitivement alors de tout syncrétisme entre la
religion et la philosophie, entre le spirituel et le temporel, laissant le monde isla-
mique maintenu entre les deux, se débattant dans l’indécision.21
Rémi Brague qualifies Averroes’s teleological definition of philo -
sophy in Fasl al-maqal as “an ad hoc definition,” part of a strategy aimed
at rendering the study of nature acceptable to religious Law.  According
to him, Islamic philosophers could either focus on drawing a connection
between the content of philosophical truth and the prophetic
message –the strategy of Ya,qub b. Ishaq al-Kindi (d. ca. 870); or they
could claim that the Qur,an itself made the study of nature obligatory
for believers, quoting the numerous verses that encourage human beings
to reflect on the marvels of creation as pointers to the Creator– the strat-
egy of Muhammad b. Yusuf al-‛Amiri (d. 992); or else they could com-
bine both arguments, as Averroes did in Fasl al-maqal.22 Brague,
nonetheless, is much more circumspect in inferring non-stated intentions.
In fact, we have no reason to assert categorically, as El-Gannouchi does,
that Averroes’s definition of philosophy in Fasl al-maqal is fallacious
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23 For a critical analysis of the esoteric interpretation of Islamic philosophy in general,
see Leaman, An Introduction to Classical Islamic Philosophy, pp. 205-236. On the question
of the “double truth” in the Fasl al-maqal, see Taylor, “‘Truth Does Not Contradict Truth’:
Averroes and the Unity of Truth.”
24 This book is a sequel to Fasl al-maqal, as Averroes himself states at the beginning
of al-Kashf. For the relationship between these two books, which are part of a trilogy, see
Mahdi, “Averroes on Divine Law and Human Wisdom.” Hereafter, all references to al-
Kashf will be taken from Najjar’s translation, Faith and Reason in Islam: Averroes’ Expo-
sition of Religious Arguments (2001). For the Arabic text, I rely on al-Jabiri’s edition
(Beirut, 1998).
25 “The former,” explains Majid Fakhry, “rests on the premise that all existent entities
here below have come to exist in order to subserve the interests of mankind and for this
reason are necessarily due to a willing and intending Agent and cannot be the product of
chance. The other argument rests on the premise that everything in the world is ‘invented’
or made by an Inventor or Maker, who is God” (Fakhry, Introduction to Faith and Reason
in Islam, p. 6, 2005 repr. Ed.). On these two arguments, see also Najjar, “Ibn Rushd’s The-
ory of Rationality,” and especially Kukkonen, “Averroes and the Teleological Argument.”
For Kukkonen, the substance of both arguments is teleological rather than cosmological
and they can be thought of as “macrocosmic and microcosmic variations on the argument
from design” (p. 408). He then goes on to argue that, although the arguments in al-Kashf
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and purposely deceptive, thereby ruling out the possibility that the Cor-
dovan philosopher did in fact believe that existing things could be indi-
cations of the Artisan
insofar as they are artifacts, for existing things indicate the Artisan only through
cognizance of the art in them, and the more complete cognizance of the art in them
is, the more complete is cognizance of the Artisan (§ 2).
By denying this possibility from the onset, El-Ghannouchi is obliged
to carry out an esoteric reading of the Fasl al-maqal, which leads him
to the conclusion that Averroes is upholding two independent orders of
truth, one for the masses and one for the philosophical elite.23 As it turns
out, we have good reason to think that Averroes did believe that existing
beings could serve as signs pointing to God. In the first chapter of his
book, al-Kashf ,an manahij al-adilla fi ,aqa,id al-milla (Uncovering the
Methods of Proof with Respect to the Beliefs of the Religious Commu-
nity),24 Averroes dismisses the two arguments most commonly advanced
by the Islamic dialectical theologians to prove God’s existence –the ar-
gument from the temporality of the universe and the argument from
contingency– as neither demonstrative for the philosophically trained
mind nor comprehensible for the populace. In lieu of these arguments,
Averroes commends the two arguments proposed by the Qur,an itself:
the argument from providence (dalil al-,inaya) and the argument from
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are non-technical (i.e., not written for metaphysicians), Averroes nevertheless takes all the
possible care not to speak against his philosophical convictions as expressed in his more
technical works. In Kukkonen’s view, we can glimpse in al-Kashf a “properly philosophical
vision of teleology and providence” (p. 418).
26 In her recent book, Avital Wohlman argues that Averroes is an original philosopher
precisely “in that the profound impetus of his thought proceeds from his faith,” and that
his convictions as a believer lead him to diverge from Aristotle (Wohlman, Al-Ghazali,
Averroës and the Interpretation of the Qur,an: Common Sense and Philosophy in Islam,
p. 70). For Wohlman, Averroes’s “certain faith in the existence of the Artisan coheres with
realigning the major concepts of Aristotelian metaphysics: nature, being, and matter,”  
a new alignment shaped by the light of faith in which “philosophical questions like the
goodness of the world and its order become theological issues” (p. 5).
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invention/creation (dalil al-ikhtira‛).25 It is beyond the scope of this
essay to decide on the actual validity of these arguments as proofs of
the existence of God. What I would like to underline, however, is the
fact that Averroes explicitly considers these two Qur,anic arguments to
be valid both for the learned and for the masses, while acknowledging
that the first are capable, by means of their mastery of the demonstrative
arts, of a deeper grasp of the natural and divine orders:
The evidence for the existence of the Artisan is confined to these two types;
namely, the argument from providence and the argument from invention. It has
also become clear that these two methods correspond exactly to the method used
by the select (meaning the learned), and that of the general public. Where the two
types of knowledge differ is in the details… All they [the general public] know is
that [the existing entities] are manufactured and that they have an existing maker.
By contrast the learned are those who theorize about the manufactured objects on
the basis of their knowledge of how such objects are made and the wisdom behind
making them. There is no doubt that whoever possesses this kind of knowledge of
manufactured objects knows the Artisan, qua Artisan, better than those who merely
know that these objects are manufactured (pp. 37-38).
In other words, Averroes is perfectly consistent with his definition
of philosophy in the Fasl al-maqal and with his contention that the
Qur,an commands human beings –the learned as much as the masses–
to consider the existing beings as indications of the Artisan.26 It seems
to me that Averroes is not upholding two orders of truth –one religious
for the masses and one philosophical for the learned–, but rather a single
order of truth and reality which admits, however, of different levels of
intellectual grasp. More about this will be said below. We need first to
address, even if succinctly, the question of Averroes’s stand in relation
to Abu Nasr al-Farabi (d. ca. 950), who was recognized within the 
Islamic philosophical tradition as the ‘Second Teacher’ after Aristotle.
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27 Black, “Reason Reflecting on Reason: Philosophy, Rationality, and the Intellect in
the Medieval Islamic and Christian Traditions,” pp. 41-42.
28 For an in-depth study of Alfarabi’s views on religion, see Mahdi, Alfarabi and the
Foundation of Islamic Political Philosophy.
29 Black, “Reason Reflecting on Reason,” p. 43.
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Averroes and the Farabian Legacy
In a recent article, Deborah Black argues that all three main Aris-
totelian Islamic philosophers –Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes– shared
“a view of the essential nature of religion that made it entirely subor-
dinate to rational understanding,” and that, in this view, “one could le-
gitimately and sincerely claim full adherence to a religious tradition
even if one’s rational belief contravened the external teachings of that
tradition.”27 According to Black, this shared understanding of the rela-
tions between philosophy and religion was first put forward by Alfarabi
and is best articulated in his Kitab al-Huruf (Book of Letters), where
he argued for the natural subordination of religion to philosophy. In ef-
fect, in this book, Alfarabi presents religion as the work of a philoso-
pher-prophet who is also a gifted orator and poet, and who crafts a
religion designed to utilize poetics and rhetoric as the means to com-
municate the truths discovered by philosophy to the non-philosophical
masses.28 Black summarizes Alfarabi’s picture of the relationship
 between philosophy and religion in two crucial but implicit assump-
tions that are operative throughout the Farabian system:
The first is an extreme and optimistic rationalism according to which there is
 nothing in the world so mysterious as to be impenetrable to the unaided human in-
tellect. Humans are capable of attaining complete, certain, demonstrative knowl-
edge in all practical and theoretical matters. It is the attainment of this certitude
that constitutes the goal and aim of philosophy. The second assumption, by con-
trast, is a deeply pessimistic view of the distribution of rationality amongst indi-
vidual humans. While all human beings are essentially rational in some measure,
their rationality admits of rather marked degrees. Thus humans can be divided into
an intellectual elite, the philosophers, who are capable of discovering and com-
prehending the unadulterated truth; and the masses, who in some measure fall short
of the philosophical ideal.29
It is the second assumption that explains Alfarabi’s view of religion
as imitation of philosophy, tailored to fit the people of a particular cul-
ture and to compensate for the intellectual deficiency of the masses.
For Black, Alfarabi’s picture of the nature of philosophy and its relation
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30 Black, “Reason Reflecting on Reason,” p. 44.
31 Black, “Reason Reflecting on Reason,” p. 44.
32 Black, “Reason Reflecting on Reason,” p. 46.
33 Black, “Reason Reflecting on Reason,” p. 55, n. 23.
34 Brown, “The Last Days of al-Ghazzali and the Tripartite Division of the Sufi World:
Abu Hamid al-Ghazzali’s Letter to the Seljuq Vizier and Commentary,” p. 97.
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to religion “was embraced with little modification by his chief succes-
sors among the falasifa, Avicenna and Averroes.”30 Referring to the
Fasl al-maqal in particular, she writes: 
I do want to note the degree to which this Averroist text depends upon the Farabian
theses I have just outlined. The Decisive Treatise offers a legal opinion that, in
 effect, it is the philosopher who is the ultimate judge and adjudicator of the truth.31
Before addressing some aspects of Black’s views that I find pro -
blematic, it is important to realize how her position differs from those
of Heller-Roazen and El-Ghannouchi. Against the latter, Black thinks
that Averroes upheld only one order of truth: the truth of reason.
Against the former, she sees Averroes as addressing the same concern
of his counterparts in the Christian West, namely, the relationship
 between faith and reason, only that Averroes upheld a fundamentally
different position:
Islamic philosophers have no trouble in explaining why Scripture is predominantly
metaphorical and narrative—its sole function is to communicate to common
 people. In contrast to Aquinas and his Christian counterparts, for Islamic philoso-
phers there is no further theological science for which revealed texts must provide
some analogue of demonstrative first principles.32 That is, the Islamic philosophers
would not have accepted the possibility of a demonstrative science like sacra doc-
trina as proposed by Aquinas… nor would have they accepted the idea of revealed
truths that exceed the bounds of reason.33
That Averroes shared Alfarabi’s assumption of the unequal distri-
bution of rationality amongst individual humans, I have no doubt. In
this sense, both of them are heirs to what Jonathan Brown calls “an
elitist strain in Islamic social and intellectual history that has its origins
in the late Umayyad and early Abbasid times,” and which was by no
means restricted to the philosophers.34 I’m not sure, however, if I share
Black’s contention that Averroes embraced to any large extent
 Alfarabi’s view of religion as imitation of philosophy. Granted that, for
Averroes, it is only the philosopher trained in the logical sciences who
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can truly understand the logic and language of Scripture and determine
how to interpret disputed passages in it. This is indeed an enormous
claim on the part of Averroes, of itself enough to earn him the antago-
nism of the more traditional religious establishment. It does not neces-
sarily follow, however, that Averroes was of a mind that the philosopher
could do without religion altogether, as implied in Black’s assertion
that Averroes thought the sole function of Scripture is to communicate
to common people. On the contrary, Averroes is quite explicit in saying
that the Law is addressed to all human beings, philosophers included.
Furthermore, in the closing remarks of the Fasl al-maqal, Averroes
chooses to define the relationship between philosophy and religion in
terms that stress equality, not subordination, and this after admitting
with sorrow that part of the harm that has afflicted religion has come
from those associated with philosophy:
Now our soul is in utmost sorrow and pain due to the corrupt dissensions and
 distorted beliefs that have permeated this Law (shari‛a), especially those that have
occurred to it from among people linking themselves to wisdom (hikma). For
 injuries from a friend are graver than injuries from an enemy—I mean that wisdom
is the companion of the Law and its milk sister (§ 59).
What can we say then about Averroes’s position regarding the rela-
tionship between reason and faith?
The Learned as the Heir of the Prophets
Averroes’s rationalism is seen, first of all, in his insistence that all
Muslims are called to give their assent to revelation, each one “in
 accordance with the method of assent his temperament and nature
 require”:
This is because people’s natures vary in excellence with respect to assent (tiba,  
al-nas mutafadila fi l-tasdiq). Thus, some assent by means of demonstration; some
assent by means of dialectical statements in the same way of one adhering to
demonstration assents by means of demonstration, there being nothing greater in
their natures; as some assent by means of rhetorical statements, just as the one
 adhering to demonstration assents by means of demonstrative statements (§ 11).
In extending its message to humankind, the “divine Law” assumes
this diversity of people’s intellectual predispositions, thus including all
three methods of calling on God. It is in this sense, and not in racial
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terms, that Averroes interprets the hadith according to which the
Prophet was sent to “the red and to the black,” that is, to all humanity
as being capable of giving rational assent to the prophetic message,
each individual according to his or her intellectual capabilities. Aver-
roes sees the Qur,an itself as referring to this triple path of assent when
it says, “Call to the path of your Lord by wisdom, fine preaching, and
arguing with them by means of what is finest” (Q 16:125) –where
 “wisdom” stands for philosophy, “preaching” for rhetorics, and
 “arguing” for dialectics.
Commentators sometimes fail to notice two important implications
of Averroes’s claim here: firstly, his insistence that rational assent is
part and parcel of the act of faith; secondly, that the “divine Law”  
is not only an alternative to philosophy for the uneducated masses, but
it addresses all human beings, including those capable of demonstrative
knowledge. As for the first point, the real import of Averroes’s claim
can perhaps be better seen if we contrast it with the views of one of his
contemporaries from the other side of the Islamic world, the Hanbalite
jurist Muwaffaq al-Din b. Qudama (d. 1223), who argued that certain
parts of the Qur,an –in particular those passages which speak of God’s
attributes– have no obligation attached to them except belief, and that
belief in them is possible without knowledge of their intended meaning,
“for indeed faith, with ignorance, is sound.”35 This sacrificium intel-
lectus, I believe, would be abhorrent to Averroes, who held in great
 esteem the rational nature of human beings, notwithstanding their dif-
ferent degrees of intellectual reach. In this regard, it is noteworthy that
in the above-mentioned chapter of al-Kashf, devoted to proving God’s
existence, Averroes insists that the Qur,anic arguments from providence
and from invention/creation are universal precisely because they
 correspond with “what He implanted in their primitive natures of
 [capacities to] understand this meaning” (p. 37), that is, because they
appeal to the innate rationality with which God has endowed human
beings. In what I find to be a remarkable statement on his part, given
the pervasive intellectual elitism that dominated the culture and which
he himself shared, Averroes goes on to say that whoever comes to
 acknowledge God’s existence by means of these arguments proposed
by Scripture
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becomes one of the learned scholars who testify to God’s lordship, along with His
own testimony and that of His angels, as the Almighty says: “Allah bears witness
that there is no god but He, and so do the angels and men of learning” (Qur,an
3:18) (p. 37).
As for the second point, once more it is the fact that Averroes insists
explicitly that the divine Law is addressed to all humankind, including
the people of demonstration. This is the reason it contains both an ap-
parent and an inner meaning, inviting them to exert their intelligence
and knowledge in order to reconcile the apparent contradictory mean-
ings of Scripture:
The reason an apparent and an inner sense are set down in the Law is the difference
in people’s innate dispositions and the variance in their innate capacities for assent.
The reason contradictory apparent senses are set down in it is to alert “those well-
grounded in science” to the interpretation that reconciles them (§ 14).
There are details in the Fasl al-maqal and elsewhere in Averroes’s
writings that seem to indicate that he understood the role of the
philosopher in quasi-religious terms. Already at the beginning of the
treatise, after having established that the study of the books of the
Ancients is obligatory according to the Law, “for their aim and in-
tention in their books is the very intention to which the Law urges
us” (§ 10), that is, reflection upon existent beings insofar as they are
indications of the Artisan, Averroes establishes two conditions that
must be fulfilled by anyone intending to study these books: “the first
being innate intelligence and the second Law-based justice and moral
virtue” (§ 10). In other words, the would-be student of Ancient phi-
losophy must unite theoretical virtue with specifically Islamic prac-
tical and moral virtue. Notice that “Law-based justice” (al-‛adala
l-shar‛iyya) implies compliance with all that Islamic Law declares
obligatory and recommended. A strange burden indeed to place as a
condition for the study of Greek philosophy if we suppose that Aver-
roes upheld the subordination of religion to philosophy! Later in the
Fasl al-maqal, Averroes will refer to the philosophically trained
scholars, as opposed to the  dialectical theologians, as the judges
“whom God has selected for  interpretation” (§ 23) of the recondite
passages of Scripture. The most remarkable statement by Averroes
about the ‘religious’ vocation of the philosopher is found, however,
in his Long Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, where he
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speaks of philosophical reflection as a form, indeed the noblest form,
of divine worship:
The shari‛ah specific to the philosophers (al-hukama,) is the investigation of all
beings, since the Creator is not worshipped by a worship more noble than the
knowledge of those things that He produced which lead to the knowledge in truth
of His essence—may He be exalted! That [investigation philosophers undertake]
is the most noble of the works belonging to Him and the most favored of them that
we do in God’s presence. How great is it to perform this service which is the most
noble of services and to take it on with this compliant obedience which is the most
sublime of obediences!36
Also rather extraordinary in this respect is Averroes’s en passant
statement in al-Kashf, in the pages devoted to God’s attribute of speech,
that the learned (al-,ulama,) are the heirs of the prophets by reason of
what God imparts to them through the intermediary of demonstrations
(bi-wasitati l-barahin). Commenting on Qur,an 42:50, a verse which
mentions three ways in which God addresses human beings (by reve-
lation, from behind a veil, and by means of a messenger), Averroes
 explains:
Revelation, then, is the creation of that meaning [intended by God] in the soul of
the person receiving it without the intermediary of utterance … And “from behind
the veil” refers to the speech that takes place through utterances created by [God]
in the soul of the one He favors with His speech … As for His saying: “Otherwise,
He sends forth a messenger,” it is the third way that occurs through the interme -
diary of an angel. God’s speech might also include that which He imparts to the
learned who are the heirs of the prophets through the intermediary of demonstra-
tions (pp. 48-49).
Concluding Remarks
To summarize and conclude, I have suggested that Averroes’s Fasl
al-maqal is not merely a juridical defense of the practice of philosophy
in terms of Islamic law, but that underneath this legal framework there
is a real concern to reconcile the findings of reason with the revealed
Word of God accepted by faith. That Averroes gave absolute prepon-
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derance to demonstrative reason over the literal wordings of Scripture
in solving any possible conflict between the two is beyond doubt. As
said earlier, that was enough of itself to earn him the hostility of a great
part of the traditional religious establishment. However, to infer from
this that Averroes saw the “divine Law” in Farabian terms, that is, as
the work of a gifted orator and poet intended to convey philosophical
truth to the masses under the guise of images and metaphors, is, to my
mind, an unwarranted conclusion. Unquestionably, Averroes had an
 exalted view of philosophy as being far above any other traditional re-
ligious science, but it is significant that he conceived “the art of arts”
in teleological terms, leading to “true cognizance” of the Divine Arti-
san. The study of philosophy required not only intellectual and moral
integrity, but also legal integrity from the viewpoint of Islamic law.
Philosophy was indeed a form of worship in itself, the noblest work to
be carried out in God’s presence. In addition to investigating all existing
beings, philosophers had been chosen by God to exert their minds in
reconciling the apparent conflicts in the revealed text, addressed to the
entire human race. God had made the learned the heirs of the prophets
by granting them a share in God’s speech through the intermediary of
demonstration.
Of course, one can always decide that what Averroes wrote and
what he really meant are two different things. It is surely preferable to
tread carefully, following Bonin’s counsel, for “we cannot have full
and certain knowledge of the inward dispositions of another human
being, especially not across a distance of centuries.”37 Did Averroes
 intend to reconcile philosophy and religion in the Fasl al-maqal or was
he only setting up clear boundaries between the two in order to protect
philosophy from religion? Who can say for sure? It seems a good idea,
therefore, to give the last word to Averroes himself, who, in a passage
of al-Kashf, explains as follows his motivation for writing these two
treatises:
The right course for [al-Ghazali] to follow would have been not to divulge philo-
 sophy (al-hikma) to the general public, but once this divulgence was done, the
right thing now was for that group of the public who believes that religion  
(al-shari,a) contradicts philosophy, to know that it does not contradict it … For
this reason, we were forced in the present work to define the fundamental principles
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of religion (usul al-shari,a). For, if its principles are carefully examined, they
would be found to be more compatible with philosophy than its interpretations.
The same is true of the opinion of those who believe that philosophy contradicts
religion. They should know that the reason is that they did not fully comprehend
philosophy or religion. That is why we were compelled to write our book Fasl
al-maqal on the accord of philosophy and religion (fi muwafaqati l-hikma
lil-shari‛a) (pp. 70-71, edited).38
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